Abstract: Owing to wireless communication's broadcast nature, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks. It is of great importance to design an efficient intrusion detection scheme (IDS) for WSNs. In this study, the authors propose a novel IDS based on energy prediction (IDSEP) in cluster-based WSNs. The main idea of IDSEP is to detect malicious nodes based on energy consumption of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes with abnormal energy consumption are identified as malicious ones. Furthermore, IDSEP is designed to differentiate categories of ongoing DoS attacks based on energy consumption thresholds. The simulation results show that IDSEP detects and recognises malicious nodes effectively.
Introduction
Many wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are organised into clusters to improve network security [1] . However, because of the broadcast nature of wireless communication, cluster-based WSNs are still vulnerable to various malicious attacks. More specifically, cluster-based WSNs are vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Cluster heads, which are elected to manage local clusters, are adversaries' ideal targets. If one cluster head is captured or compromised by adversaries, an entire local cluster will be affected by DoS attacks. This highlights the fact that cluster-based WSNs require an efficient intrusion detection scheme (IDS) to detect DoS attacks.
DoS attacks are the most common malicious attacks and cannot easily defend. In [2] , a DoS attack is defined as any event that diminishes or eliminates a network's capacity to perform its expected function. Hardware failures, software bugs, resource exhaustion, environmental conditions or any complicated interaction between these factors can cause a DoS attack. Compared to the Internet, DoS attacks in WSNs are different. Each layer of WSNs is vulnerable to different DoS attacks [2] . Each kind of attack has different nature and characteristics. It is difficult to develop a unified mechanism that can detect and find all DoS attacks. Therefore in this paper, we take into account the DoS attacks in the routing layer, such as selective forwarding attack. In a selective forwarding attack, a malicious node behaves like a black hole refusing to forward sensitive messages or simply drops the messages ensuring that they are not propagated any further.
Few IDSs [3] [4] [5] are proposed for cluster-based WSNs. Existing IDSs can be briefly classified into two categories: signature-based detection schemes and anomaly-based detection schemes. Both of the two categories focus on identifying behaviours of malicious nodes. They consume a large amount of energy to monitor suspicious nodes. Thus, it is critical to develop an effective IDS to defend DoS attacks [6] [7] [8] .
In this paper, we first discuss categories of DoS attacks in cluster-based WSNs. Then, we propose IDSEP to defend the DoS attacks. Two notable features of IDSEP are listed as follows: † IDSEP uses an energy prediction method to predict sensor nodes' energy consumption and detect DoS attacks. † IDSEP differentiates categories of ongoing DoS attacks based on energy consumption thresholds.
To the best of our knowledge, in the previous research work, energy prediction method has never been discussed. The two notable above-mentioned features make IDSEP a new and efficient solution that detects DoS attacks.
The rest of paper is organised as follows: Section 2 states related work of IDSs. Section 3 describes network model. Section 4 presents the energy characteristic of DoS attacks in cluster-based WSNs. Section 5 introduces the energy prediction method. Section 5 presents details of IDSEP. Section 7 theoretically analyses resilience of IDSEP. In Section 8, we discuss simulation results. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
Related work
Many schemes have been proposed to defend malicious attacks, for example, trust management [9] and encryption key schemes [10, 11] . In [12] , Mohi et al. proposed a technique known as spontaneous watchdogs, which adopts both local and global agents to watch over communications. Global agents are activated in every cluster. Global agents with spontaneous watchdogs can receive both normal and relayed packets. If malicious nodes alter or selectively forward packets, the global agents can easily detect them using spontaneous watchdogs.
In [13] , Wang et al. characterised several environment parameters such as node density and sensing range in terms of a desirable intrusion detection probability. The detection probability is derived based on two sensing models: single-sensing detection model and multiple-sensing detection model. In addition, the authors discussed the network connectivity and broadcast coverage, which are necessary conditions to ensure the corresponding detection probability in a WSN. However, not any IDS is proposed to defend against DoS attacks.
In [14] , Khanum et al. proposed an energy-efficient intrusion detection system for WSNs based on Muhammad Usman and Surraya Khanum (MUSK) agent. The MUSK agent is installed on each node that continuously monitors malicious attacks. It is assumed that the MUSK agent is resilient against malicious nodes. However, this assumption is not realistic in many real-world applications. Furthermore, only the architecture and the communication structure of MUSK agent are discussed. How to detect malicious nodes is neglected.
In [15] , Li et al. proposed a group-based IDS in WSNs. The group-based IDS first divides sensor nodes into many groups using the δ-grouping algorithm. Sensor nodes in a group are physically close to each other. This feature makes it easier to detect malicious nodes. The scheme then adopts Mahalanobis distance measurement and orthogonalised Gnanadesikan-Kettenring estimators to ensure a high detection rate.
In [16] , Su et al. provided an energy-efficient and secure system for cluster-based WSNs, called efficient hybrid intrusion prohibition system (eHIP). The eHIP system consists of authentication-based intrusion prevention subsystem and collaboration-based intrusion detection subsystem. The simulation results show that eHIP is an energy-efficient and secure system, especially in a highly hostile area. However, continually monitoring the behaviours of neighbour nodes consumes abundant energy resources.
In [17] , Hsieh et al. adopted security modules to improve secure communication in cluster-based WSNs. The security modules use the authentication scheme to prevent intrusion from external malicious nodes. Internal compromised nodes are also excluded by the trust evaluation module.
In [18] , Khalil et al. proposed a framework known as Utilizing Neighbor Monitoring for Attacks Mitigation in Multihop Wireless Sensor Networks (UnMask), which mitigates attacks by detecting, diagnosing and isolating malicious nodes. In UnMask, sensor nodes oversee their neighbour nodes' communication. Based on UnMask, the authors build a secure routing protocol that provides additional protection against malicious nodes by supporting multiple node-disjoint paths.
Comparison of conventional IDSs is listed in Table 1 ; we can conclude that there are no IDS which can efficiently detect the five types of DoS attacks at the same time. All these IDSs are carried out by observing or monitoring sensor nodes. Monitoring behaviours of sensor nodes consumes many energy resources, therefore they are not suitable for resource-constrained WSNs [18, 19] . Furthermore, the packet forwarding in WSNs is unstable and packet loss is likely to occur during transmission process. Therefore IDSs based on monitoring the behaviours of sensor nodes cannot detect DoS attacks efficiently.
Network model
The cluster-based WSN considered in this paper consists of three kinds of static nodes: cluster members, cluster heads and one sink node. Operation of cluster-based WSN begins with a set-up phase, followed by a steady-state phase. Clusters are formed in the set-up phase, and data are transferred to the sink node in the steady-state phase. In set-up phase, cluster heads are elected based on the trust management scheme which is proposed in [20] . The rest of sensor nodes, called cluster members, choose proper clusters to join in. In the steady-state phase, cluster members are responsible for sensing environment data. Each cluster head creates a time schedule for members in its cluster. After collecting environment data, cluster members send them during their allocated transmission time to cluster heads. Cluster heads aggregate the data and send them to the sink node.
It is known that the sink node is the base station of a network and the centre of data processing. In this paper, the sink node is responsible for malicious nodes detection. First, the sink node predicts energy consumption of the sensor nodes. Then, the sink node compares the predicted and actual energy consumption. Sensor nodes, which consume abnormal energy are detected as malicious ones. The sink node is the most critical part of a sensor network. If an adversary can compromise the sink node, the entire WSN will be attacked by the adversary. Therefore we assume that the sink node is provided with high computational capabilities, large storage and unlimited energy. It cannot be compromised by malicious nodes. Therefore security issues of the sink node can be safely ignored.
The assumptions in this paper are listed as follows: † The cluster-based WSN is deployed in a homogeneous manner. Sensor nodes have the same resources, for example, energy, computation and communication capabilities. † DoS attacks are launched by compromised nodes, which are also called malicious nodes. † Sensor nodes consume the same energy when they operate in the same working stage, for example, transmitting or www.ietdl.org receiving packets. The number of clusters is M. The average number of sensor nodes in each cluster is N.
DoS attacks in cluster-based WSNs
In this paper, we study five types of DoS attacks: (i) selective forwarding attack, (ii) hello flood attack, (iii) Sybil attack, (iv) wormhole attack and (v) sinkhole attack. † In a selective forwarding attack, malicious node refuses to forward sensitive messages or simply drops the messages ensuring that they are not propagated any further. † In a hello flood attack, malicious node broadcasts large quantities of useless data packets to neighbour nodes in its communication range. The common characteristic of hello flood attack is to exhaust the available network communication bandwidth. † In a Sybil attack, malicious node has multiple identities. The malicious node can fabricate a new identity, or steal an identity from a legitimate node. Therefore the malicious node can send messages with different identities. † In a wormhole attack, malicious node records a packet or individual bits of a packet at one location in the network. Then, it tunnels the packet (possibly selectively) to another location and replays it. † In a sinkhole attack, malicious node typically works by misleading itself look especially attractive to surrounding nodes. For example, malicious nodes pretend to have the shortest paths to the base station. Therefore they can trick other nodes into forwarding messages to them.
In order to detect the five types of DoS attacks, we assume that all sensor nodes are trusted at the beginning of the network. Moreover, we assume that malicious nodes cannot lie about their power consumption. Therefore sink node can use energy consumption to detect the five types of DoS attacks.
The characteristics of the five types of DoS attacks against cluster-based WSNs are summarised in Table 2 . Nodes that launch selective forwarding attack consume less energy than normal nodes do, since malicious nodes forward fewer packets. Nodes that launch the other four kinds of DoS attacks consume much more energy than normal nodes do. Malicious nodes can be detected based on the differences in energy consumption.
Adversaries can compromise any node except the sink node in the network. The compromised nodes mislead other nodes into believing that they are the best candidates of cluster heads. After being selected as cluster heads, the compromised nodes launch DoS attacks. Here, we take classical routing protocol LEACH [21] as an example to explain this problem. LEACH operates in rounds, each of which contains two phases: † Cluster initial phase: In this phase, sensor nodes can be captured by malicious nodes. Then, using hello flood attack, malicious nodes declare themselves to be new cluster heads by sending announcement messages to neighbour nodes. † Data delivery phase: Cluster heads manage communication between clusters and the sink node. Cluster heads can be captured by malicious nodes. Betrayed cluster heads selectively forward messages, or launch DoS attacks. In this way, communications in the network are disturbed.
Other hierarchical protocols such as TEEN [22] and PEGASIS [23] are also vulnerable to the above-mentioned DoS attacks.
Energy prediction model
Malicious nodes consume abnormal energy to launch DoS attacks. Therefore we primarily focus on an energy prediction method to detect malicious nodes. In this paper, a Markov chain model [24] is adopted to periodically predict energy consumption of sensor nodes. It is believed that energy is mainly consumed in the last four states. Energy consumption of each sensor node in the last four states is predicted by the Markov chain model [24] .
Energy consumption

Operation state transition model
As shown in Fig. 1 , operation states shift when a node sends or receives packets, calculates data or senses information. A time-step is the minimum time unit of the four operation states. In cluster-based routing protocols, if each round time T round contains m time-steps, then T round = m × T time-step . Each state covers several time-steps. In one time-step, state i shifts to state j with a probability of P ij , where i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
In a series of n time-steps, the operation states of a sensor node can be denoted as X = {X 0 , X 1 , …, X n }. P (n) ij represents the probability of state transition from state i to j in n time-steps. Therefore the n-stage transition probabilities can be defined as
When a sensor node's operation state shifts from i to j in n 
If the sink node knows the transition probabilities of sensor nodes as well as the initial states X 0 of sensor nodes, it is possible to predict energy consumption. The prediction process can be described as follows Firstly, when the sensor node is in state i, the sink node counts the number of time-steps the node will stay in the next state j in each round time T round m t=1 P (t) ij Secondly, the sink node predicts the energy consumption of the sensor node
where E j is energy consumption in state j of one time-step.
Energy prediction error
The energy prediction error is shown in Fig. 2 . Each round time is set as 150 s. In the first 150 s, the value of actual energy consumption is higher than that of the predicted one. During the initial phase, all sensor nodes have same energy and the same state transition probability. Although any sensor node is chosen as a cluster head, the actual energy consumption of the sensor node will be higher than that of the predicted one. Then, in the next round, the cluster head turns to be cluster member. The cumulative state transition probability of the cluster head is not suitable for the cluster member. Therefore the value of the actual energy consumption is lower than that of the predicted one.
The prediction error σ is impacted by several environment parameters, for example, the number of sensor nodes, the sink node's position, the network size, the communication range and so no. When there are 100 sensor nodes randomly deployed in a WSN and the communication range is set as 25 m, the prediction error σ is shown in Fig. 3 .
Details of IDSEP
The main contributions of IDSEP are: (i) detection of malicious nodes and (ii) classification of ongoing DoS attacks. Based on the energy prediction method, the sink node predicts energy consumption of sensor nodes. By comparing the predicted and the actual energy consumption, sensor nodes with abnormal energy consumption are identified as malicious ones. Then, the sink node differentiates categories of ongoing DoS attacks according to four energy consumption thresholds.
Detection of malicious nodes
At the beginning of the first round, we assume that the sink node knows all sensor nodes' initial energy E i1 and operation states. Therefore based on the energy prediction method, the sink node can predict sensor nodes' energy www.ietdl.org consumption in the first round, denoted as E p1 . At the end of the first round, the sink node broadcasts an energy gathering message. Sensor nodes that receive the message check their residual energy E r1 and reply to the sink node with the residual energy value and operation states. The actual energy consumption is E a1 = E i1 − E r1 . If the actual energy consumption E a1 is not consistent with the predicted one E p1 , the sensor node would be regarded as a malicious one. Fig. 4 shows an example of IDSEP detecting the malicious node in a single cluster.
The sink node uses the residual energy E r (i) and operation states to predict energy consumption in the next round, denoted as E p (i). Then in the next round, after receiving the residual energy E ′ r (i) from all sensor nodes, the actual energy consumption is E a (i) = E r (i) − E ′ r (i). The energy comparison between the predicted and the actual energy consumption is the key to detect malicious nodes. If IDSEP scheme detects abnormal energy consumption of a sensor node, the sink node regards the node as malicious and record the node's ID in a blacklist. Sensor nodes in the blacklist will be segregated from the sensor network by removing it from the route table.
Classification of ongoing DoS attacks
Once malicious nodes are detected, it is essential to identify categories of DoS attacks launched by the malicious nodes. The energy comparison between the predicted and the actual energy consumption is given as E c (i) = |E p (i) − E a (i)|. IDSEP differentiates the categories of the ongoing DoS attacks based on four thresholds T = {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 }.
Definition of four thresholds:
The thresholds are set based on different energy consumption rates of DoS attacks. The energy consumption rates are shown in Fig. 5 . hello flood attack has the highest energy consumption rate about 0.0333 J/s, whereas selective forwarding attack has the lowest energy consumption rate 0.00297 J/s. The nodes consuming lower energy than normal nodes are detected as malicious nodes launching a selective forwarding attack. The nodes consuming twice as much energy as normal nodes are detected as malicious nodes launching a wormhole attack. The nodes consuming the highest energy are detected as malicious nodes launching a hello flood attack.
We adopt the energy model in [25] to obtain energy consumption of normal nodes. When sending a message with k bits, the energy consumption is
where E elec is energy consumption for sending each bit, d is the distance between the sender and receiver and ε amp is the energy consumption exponent. To receive this message, energy consumption of each sensor node is
The number of clusters is M. The average number of the sending and receiving message for each sensor node are n s and n r . The four thresholds are set as follows
Differentiating the categories of DoS attacks:
According to the four thresholds, we have: † Case 1: 0 ≤ E c (i) ≤ σ, then sensor node i is regarded as a legal one, where σ is the energy prediction error. † Case 2: σ < E c (i) ≤ T 1 , then sensor node i is regarded as a malicious one launching a selective forwarding attack. † Case 3: T 1 < E c (i) ≤ T 2 , then sensor node i is regarded as a malicious one launching a wormhole attack. † Case 4: T 2 < E c (i) ≤ T 3 , then sensor node i is regarded as a malicious one launching a Sybil attack. † Case 5: T 3 < E c (i) ≤ T 4 , then sensor node i is regarded as a malicious one launching a sinkhole attack. † Case 6: E c (i) > T 4 , then sensor node i is regarded as a malicious one launching a hello flood attack.
Verifying the four thresholds:
The actual energy consumed by the node launching a selective forwarding attack is less than the predicted one. Whereas the nodes launching the other four kinds of DoS attacks consume more energy than normal nodes do, as shown in Fig. 6 .
The round dotted line represents the average energy consumption of a malicious node launching hello flood attack. The malicious node maximises its broadcast range. Therefore energy consumption is significantly high. As shown in Fig. 6 , a malicious node launching hello flood can only survive for about 60 s. Therefore hello flood attack is the easiest one to be detected. The line with multiplication sign ( × ) represents the average energy consumption of a malicious node launching sinkhole attack. The difference between the predicted and the actual average energy consumption of sinkhole attack increases gradually as the simulation time goes. IDSEP can recognise sinkhole attack at the beginning of the simulation, since the average energy consumption is far beyond the predicted one.
The five-pointed star line represents the average energy consumption of a malicious node launching Sybil attack. The malicious node has several identities. These fake nodes are deployed in other clusters and controlled by the malicious node. Therefore the malicious node's energy consumption is much higher than the predicted one. IDSEP can detect Sybil attack when average energy consumption is significantly greater than the predicted one.
The line with plus sign ( + ) represents the average energy consumption of a malicious node launching wormhole attack. As shown in Fig. 6 , the malicious node's energy consumption is twice as much as the predicted one in the first 160 s. Then, malicious node's energy consumption significantly increases. It uses up all 2 J energy in the first 160 s, whereas the normal node just uses < 0.5 J. The wormhole attack can be easily detected, since the energy consumption of nodes launching wormhole attack is twice as much as that of normal ones. IDSEP can detect this abnormal energy consumption at the beginning of simulation within 140 s.
The line with asterisk sign represents the average energy consumption of a malicious node launching selective forwarding attack. The packet drop rate is set to be 50%. The difference between the predicted and the actual average energy consumption raises after 60 s, then, IDSEP can detect this kind of attack.
Theoretical analysis
In this section, we will discuss the resiliency of IDSEP against DoS attacks. IDSEP is resilient to a malicious attack, if it can detect malicious node i launching the malicious attack. If the sensor node i is legal, the actual energy consumption E a (i) is consistent with the predicted one E p (i). We have 0 ≤ E c (i) ≤ σ. Theorem 7.1: IDSEP is resilient to selective forwarding attack.
Proof: In a selective forwarding attack, node i forwards data packets selectively with a possibility of r, 0 ≤ r < 1. Therefore the actual energy consumption E a (i) is E a (i) = rE p (i). We have
As σ is very small, we have E c (i) = |(1 − r)|E p (i) > σ. Therefore the sensor node i is a malicious one. The selective forwarding attack is detected by IDSEP. □ Theorem 7.2: IDSEP is resilient to wormhole attack.
Proof: In a wormhole attack, node i tunnels the data packets to its partner and replays it through an out-of-band channel or high-powered transmission. For one thing, node i needs to communicate with the sink node normally, for another thing, node i communicates with its partner to launch the wormhole attack. Therefore it consumes at least twice as much energy as the normal one does. E a (i) ≥ 2E p (i). We have
Therefore the sensor node i is a malicious one. The wormhole attack is detected by IDSEP. □ Theorem 7.3: IDSEP is resilient to Sybil attack.
Proof: In a Sybil attack, node i has virtually multiple identities. We assume that the number of identities is m i . Only one identity is real, the other m i − 1 is fake. Node i can pretend as m i nodes. Therefore it consumes m i times as much energy as the normal one does. E a (i) = m i E p (i). We have
As m i ≥ 2, we have E c (i) = |(1 − m i )|E p (i) > σ. Therefore the sensor node i is a malicious one. The Sybil attack is detected by IDSEP. □ Theorem 7.4: IDSEP is resilient to sinkhole attack.
Proof: In a sinkhole attack, node i advertises high-quality routes to the sink node. Then, node i attracts surrounding neighbour nodes with unfaithful routing information. If the number of the neighbour nodes is m n , it consumes m n times as much energy as the normal one does. E a (i) = m n E p (i).
We have
As σ is very small, we have E c (i) = |(1 − m i )|E p (i) > σ. Therefore the sensor node i is a malicious one. The sinkhole attack is detected by IDSEP. □ Theorem 7.5: IDSEP is resilient to hello flood attack.
Proof: In a hello flood attack, node i sends as many data packets as possible with abnormally high transmission energy to all the clusters. If the number of the clusters is M, it consumes at least M times as much energy as the normal one does. E a (i) = ME p (i). We have 
Simulations and performance analysis
We use Network Simulator-2 [26] to evaluate performance of IDSEP. In order to see how IDSEP detects the five categories of DoS attacks, 100 nodes are randomly deployed. The size of network is 100 m × 100 m. Each node has an omni-directional antenna with a nominal radio range of 25 m. The detailed parameters are listed in Table 3 .
Network lifetime
Network lifetime is an important indicator to evaluate performance of IDSs. IDSs should be designed with energy efficiency to prolong network lifetime. However, in order to detect malicious nodes, the proposed security schemes monitor misbehaviour of sensor nodes or gather security information from the network, which heavily raises the network communication overhead. In this paper, we evaluate network lifetime with different IDSs. As shown in Fig. 7 , once DoS attacks occur in the WSN, the number of survival nodes decrease sharply. In this case, IDSs can prolong the lifetime by defending against malicious nodes, because when malicious nodes are detected, IDSs can reestablish secure communications. However, compared with the network without malicious nodes, all WSNs with IDSs under the malicious attacks still suffer a significant decrease in the network lifetime. It shows that a WSN with IDSEP has the longest lifetime, which is 30% longer than that of GTMS, since IDSEP does not need to monitor behaviours of sensor nodes.
Network throughput
Network throughputs of different WSNs are shown in Fig. 8 . Once malicious nodes launch DoS attacks, network communication is severely disrupted. Therefore a WSN without any IDS suffers from obvious decrease of network throughput. When malicious nodes are elected as cluster heads and do not forward packets to sink node, the throughput significantly decreases to 13.5 kbps. In other words, the network throughput is almost decreased by 94%. On the contrary, a WSN with IDSEP raises network throughput by detecting malicious nodes. Fig. 9 shows detection ratios of different IDSs, for example, IDSEP, group-based intrusion detection and insider attack detection. The detection ratio of IDSEP is much higher than that of group-based intrusion detection. The higher detection ratio lies in the fact that malicious nodes have to spend abnormal energy to conduct DoS attacks. This character makes IDSEP efficiently detect malicious nodes based on energy consumption.
Detection ratio
Comparison of energy consumption
In WSNs, sensor nodes have limited battery life in many applications. Owing to energy limitation of sensor nodes, it is important to use energy efficiently for each sensor node [27, 28] . Fig. 10 shows comparison of energy consumption among several IDSs. We can see that IDSEP consumes less energy than that of group-based intrusion detection and insider attack detection, because IDSEP does not require additional energy to monitor sensor nodes' behaviours.
Conclusions
This paper proposes a novel IDS based on energy prediction method for cluster-based WSNs, named IDSEP. Compared with the existing IDSs, which mainly focus on monitoring behaviours of malicious nodes, IDSEP detects malicious nodes based on energy consumption. Furthermore, IDSEP can differentiate categories of ongoing DoS attacks based on energy consumption rates of malicious nodes. Simulation results show that the proposed IDSEP is more efficient than related work in detecting DoS attacks. However, in the real WSN applications, there are many factors that will disturb the implementation of IDSEP, for example, propagation delay. Therefore in the future, we will deploy the IDSEP in a real WSN and evaluate the performance of IDSEP in the real WSN by considering new factors such as sensitivity, observation error, delays, computation consumption, etc. www.ietdl.org
